The Birth of Sensory Power: How a pandemic made it visible by Isin, Engin & Ruppert, Evelyn
Isin, Engin and Ruppert, Evelyn. 2020. The Birth of Sensory Power: How a pandemic made it
visible. Big Data & Society, pp. 1-28. ISSN 2053-9517 [Article] (Forthcoming)
http://research.gold.ac.uk/29320/
The version presented here may differ from the published, performed or presented work. Please
go to the persistent GRO record above for more information.
If you believe that any material held in the repository infringes copyright law, please contact
the Repository Team at Goldsmiths, University of London via the following email address:
gro@gold.ac.uk.
The item will be removed from the repository while any claim is being investigated. For
more information, please contact the GRO team: gro@gold.ac.uk
 1 
 
The birth of sensory power: how a pandemic made it visible 
 
Engin Isin, Professor of International Politics, Queen Mary University of London.  
Evelyn Ruppert, Professor of Sociology, Goldsmiths College, University of London.  
Forthcoming, Big Data & Society (Author Accepted Manuscript, 7/10/20)  
Abstract 
Much has been written about data politics in the last decade, which has generated myriad 
concepts such as ‘surveillance capitalism’, ‘gig economy’, ‘quantified self’, ‘algorithmic 
governmentality’, ‘data colonialism’, ‘data subjects’, and ‘digital citizens.’ Yet, it has been 
difficult to plot these concepts into an historical series to discern specific continuities and 
discontinuities since the origins of modern power in its three major forms: sovereign, 
disciplinary, and regulatory. This article argues that the coronavirus pandemic in 2020 
brought these three forms of power into sharp relief but made particularly visible a fourth 
form of power that we name ‘sensory power’, which has been emerging since the 1980s. 
The article draws on early studies of power by Michel Foucault, subsequent studies on 
biopower and biopolitics that expanded on them, and studies in the past decade that 
focused on data produced from apps, devices, and platforms. Yet, despite its ambition, the 
article is inevitably an outline of a much larger project.  
Keywords 
Sensory power, assemblages, coronavirus, resistance, Foucault, Deleuze  
Introduction 
To understand how the coronavirus pandemic is mobilizing data practices, we start with an 
analysis of the forms of power that generate, assemble, and organize data. To put it 
differently, our starting point is not data but forms of power that produce and act upon it. It 
is through this analysis that we come to propose the dawn of a new form of power that we 
name sensory power.  
Taking a long historical view on the development of modern power – the ways in which the 
accumulation of subject peoples engenders accumulation of knowledge and enables 
accumulation of capital – we start with what Foucault recognised as the changing forms of 
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power since the 17th century in the West. We are most familiar with sovereign (straddling 
17th and 18th centuries), disciplinary (straddling 18th and 19th centuries) forms and to 
some extent regulatory forms (straddling 19th and 20th centuries). The differences in how 
each form is exercised are exemplified in how each governs peoples: sovereign power seeks 
to extract obedience; disciplinary power demands submission; and, regulatory power aims 
to calibrate the effects of obedience and submission on the health and wealth of 
populations.  
We shall shortly elaborate on these three forms of power, but the primary aim of this article 
is to propose a fourth form of power that has not yet been named, at least explicitly, and 
which we will not formally define but instead situate and describe in relation to the other 
forms. We name it ‘sensory power’ which, we suggest, straddles the 20th and 21st centuries 
and perhaps more precisely the period from 1980 to 2020. Its origins can be traced to 
computational technologies used in UK and US censuses in the 19th century imagined by 
Charles Babbage (‘difference engine’), manufactured by Georg Scheutz, and assembled for 
use by William Farr in the office of the Registrar-General for England to compile vital 
statistics about populations (Hacking 1990, 53). Certainly, disciplinary and regulatory forms 
of power in the 19th century precipitated the development of computational technologies. 
By the 20th century these became the information technologies that facilitated the 
development of military, governmental, and corporate networks, which by the 21st century 
took the form of personal networks through the internet. It is this personalized, 
miniaturized, and distributed computing since the 1980s, and apps, devices, and platforms 
especially since the 1990s, that facilitated tracking and tracing technologies and spawned 
the logic of platforms for data-based services. From military, finance, hospitality and 
transportation to health, all sectors have come to depend on data that tracks and traces 
people in their movements, sentiments, needs, and desires. However, the sensors that 
make up these technologies and the data they generate have engendered not only new 
ways of accumulation of capital but also the accumulation of subject peoples. By sensors we 
mean different technologies of detecting, identifying and making people sense-able through 
various forms of digitized data (text, number, image, sound, signal and so on) about their 
conduct such as transactions, movements, searches, clicks, and so on.  It is through relations 
with such sensors – whether fitness apps, music streaming services or location-aware 
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devices – that people are subjectified and come into being as subject peoples.  It is through 
the proliferation of sensors in almost all parts of lives that subject peoples have been 
formed.  The birth of sensory power, therefore, does not only signal new technologies of 
accumulating capital and subject peoples but also how new ways of life are being brought 
into being.     
The question that concerns us is whether the novel coronavirus pandemic has made this 
new form of power visible and articulable in the early 21st century. That is, while sensors in 
forms described above have been proliferating since the 1980s, it is under the conditions of 
the pandemic that the form of power they constitute has become clearly or readily evident 
and perceptible. We argue that the tracking and tracing of infections, movements, contacts, 
and so on are expressions of this new form of power. While there have been critiques of 
tracking and tracing from various perspectives such as those concerned with privacy, 
surveillance, and dispossession (Couldry and Mejias 2019; Lyon 2018; Zuboff 2019), we hope 
that studying this new form of power within a longer historical perspective will enable us to 
identify forms of resistance that it may elicit.  
We have been working over the past few years on understanding this new form of power 
(Bigo et al. 2019; Isin and Ruppert 2019, 2020). This is a work-in-progress and our language 
has been changing along with our thoughts. The responses of international and national 
authorities (governmental, corporate, organizational) to the coronavirus pandemic in 2020, 
however, brought some of our thoughts into sharp relief so much so that, despite its 
ongoing effects, we are convinced that it is timely to share, however perfunctory, a series of 
propositions as an outline of this larger project. Before we state our propositions on sensory 
power, however, we do need to provide a brief overview of sovereign, disciplinary and 
regulatory forms of power with examples from governmental and corporate responses to 
the coronavirus pandemic in the present. We then hope to illustrate how the coronavirus 
pandemic is making a fourth form of power visible and articulable.  
Forms of power: sovereign, disciplinary, regulatory  
This brief overview on forms of power is necessary since their periodisation or operations 
have become major points of disagreement. Foucault’s studies in the 1970s (1977a, 1978, 
1980) where he understood power as strategies and technologies through which people 
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govern the behaviour of others and selves proved extraordinarily productive (Lemke 2011). 
Foucault dramatically expanded the concept of government from states to various sites such 
as clinics, workhouses, hospitals, armies, prisons, camps, schools, cities, and spaces where 
governing behaviour of others and selves precipitated inventions of strategies and 
technologies by which it was accomplished (Lemke 2019). Yet, a generation of scholars have 
astutely and meticulously highlighted the limits of Foucault’s studies on forms of power but 
their work in turn has neither produced agreement nor robust analytics of power. The 
overall picture is complex but nevertheless we attempt to encapsulate a version in Table 1, 
which helped us organise our thoughts by serving as an analytical device. Each row 
represents a form of power named to capture what is organised in each column and which 
we briefly elaborate in this article:  the strategies and technologies it deploys, knowledges it 
produces, objects it governs, assemblages it enacts, and resistances it elicits.  
[Table 1 about here] 
When we say a form of power, we mean a governing logic through which power produces 
effects. The three forms of power are identified by the name given to their distinct logics: 
sovereign, disciplinary, and regulatory. We use strategies, like Foucault, to indicate various 
actions that are purposive but non-subjective. There are strategies of power in and through 
which subjects purposively take positions, but which are not a product of any singular or 
collective subject. We refer to technologies, like Foucault, in a broader sense to include not 
only devices, computers, services, switches, and routers but also ways of organizing actions 
and practices. Strategies and technologies give rise to specific knowledges necessary for 
their exercise and realisation such as those of scientific disciplines (e.g., medicine) and their 
objects of government (e.g., populations).  All forms of power are exercised through 
assemblages such as colonies, factories and classifications enacted by relations between 
technologies, practices, data, methods, agencies, authorities, professions, and so on. And 
finally, while people are subjects to power, each form elicits different resistances from 
people as subjects of power such as revolt and evasion.  
A key insight on these three forms of power is how the ‘accumulation of capital’ is 
intertwined with the ‘accumulation of subject peoples’. These two phrases expressed in 
connection with forms of power may surprise some readers but it was Foucault (1977a, 220-
221) who insisted that ‘the two processes – the accumulation of men [i.e., subject peoples] 
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and the accumulation of capital – cannot be separated; it would not have been possible to 
solve the problem of the accumulation of [subject peoples] without the growth of an 
apparatus of production capable of both sustaining them and using them; conversely, the 
techniques that made the cumulative multiplicity of [peoples] useful accelerated the 
accumulation of capital.’ The accumulation of subject peoples (making multiplicities of 
peoples useful, healthy, and productive) and the accumulation of capital (generating 
economic, cultural, social capital and transforming them into wealth) also require the 
accumulation of knowledge (about objects and subjects of power) appropriate to these 
forms. These relations require, as Foucault (1980) expressed many times, that power 
function both negatively (cruelty, threat, fear, dread, torture, despair) and positively (desire, 
attraction, seduction, fulfilment, hope).  
Yet several disagreements with Foucault’s studies have emerged on a few key premises. We 
will list these schematically to indicate that these disagreements now shape how we 
understand forms of power. The first concerns a claim, which Foucault repeated on several 
occasions and which some of his most astute interpreters cited in turn. Foucault (1977a) 
often claimed that sovereign forms of power were always ritual, costly and violent. We think 
sovereign power is a more pervasive form than Foucault assumed. Its mode of extraction of 
obedience does not necessarily or always rely on costly and violent forms. There are always 
various negative and positive repertoires available for its exercise and sovereign power itself 
has gone through changes over time (a point we elaborate later). Second, Foucault often 
expressed that sovereign powers ‘soon fell into disuse and were superseded by a subtle, 
calculated technology of subjection’ (1977a, 220). This claim was repeated by Gilles Deleuze 
(1990a, 1990b), who argued that ‘disciplinary societies’ were giving way to ‘control 
societies’. These claims of supersession of any form of power are not borne out of our own 
studies (Isin 2002). We do not think that forms of power fall into disuse and are simply 
superseded by new forms. We would rather interpret how new forms of power articulate 
into existing forms, nestle within them for periods, and possibly mutate into new forms. 
Foucault (1978, 149) sometimes expressed this as a passage from one form of power to 
another with overlappings, echoes, and interactions but the assumption of supersession 
remained fairly constant. As James Scott (2017) has shown, all forms of power may have 
existed in incipient and nestled forms since the origins of cities, states, and empires as 
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organized polities. There is a limit to focus only on modern power since the seventeenth 
century in Europe while deeper and broader genealogies of power paint a more complex 
picture. Third, there is an implicit but a key claim in Foucault’s studies where modern forms 
of power, especially modes of subjectification, are symmetrical. This is partly borne out of 
Foucault’s brilliant intervention that power functioned not only negatively but also 
positively, but which forced his thought to project an image where all actors act on each 
other’s actions on a level playing field. In Foucault’s studies, asymmetries – which are 
themselves also both products and enablers of power relations, such as class, gender, and 
race – played rather ambiguous roles (Stoler 2016). Lastly, which is partly a consequence of 
focusing on modern power in Europe, Foucault limited himself to ‘societies such as ours’ 
while ignoring how ‘societies such as ours’ were fashioned through domination, 
dispossession, and oppression of ‘other societies’. To put it differently, as Walter Mignolo 
(2003, 2011) vividly illustrated, modernity and coloniality were two aspects of the same 
development in different forms of power and its neglect is an important limit in Foucault’s 
studies on power (Isin 2012). Empires experimented on subject peoples with various 
strategies and technologies of power in colonies that were taken up in the metropole 
(Mbembe 2001). We cannot isolate ‘societies such as ours’ from ‘societies such as theirs’ 
and this recognition has substantial implications for studying power.  
There is a complicated matter of how Foucault articulated, developed, and broadened his 
studies on forms of power during his lectures that were published posthumously and 
whether these lectures provide elaborations beyond the published studies. Stuart Elden 
(2016) and Thomas Lemke (2019) provide detailed accounts of how Foucault’s lectures and 
books coincided or diverged. They offer insights on especially the lectures Society Must be 
Defended (2003), Security, Territory, Population (2007), and The Birth of Biopolitics (2008). 
We cannot enter into this complicated matter in the space of this article, but we are 
uncertain whether these lectures would resolve the four disagreements we noted above. 
The following sketch is therefore our reflections on the three forms of power in order to 
propose a fourth.   
We now want to reflect on the coronavirus pandemic to illustrate how each form of power 
functions through several strategies and technologies, forms of knowledge and objects of 
government. We have observed how sovereign power is extracting obedience (lockdown, 
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curfew, containment); disciplinary power demanding submission (sacrifice, distancing, 
isolation, punishment, hygiene); and, regulatory power calibrating the effects of obedience 
and submission on the health of populations (infection, transmission, mortality, recovery, 
and immunity rates). Below we elaborate on each of these three forms of power as a segue 
to our discussion of a fourth form of power that is entwined with but distinct from these 
three forms in the present.  
What is sovereign power? Straddling the 17th and 18th centuries the birth of sovereign 
power is associated with, on the one hand, the birth of modern empires and, on the other, 
state apparatuses with which they were governed. In this period, the concern of sovereign 
power increasingly became the health and wealth of subject peoples. European empires 
were built by accumulating subject peoples with slavery, colonising indigenous peoples, and 
settling colonies. If each of these movements required extracting obedience from subject 
peoples, it also precipitated searching for more effective and efficient ways of governing 
them. If the key objects of government were territories governed through technologies of 
settlement, deportation, and dispossession, key forms of knowledge also developed on the 
wealth and health of subject peoples known as political arithmetic (Petty 1888). The 
accumulation of mercantile capital would have been inconceivable without the transatlantic 
slave trade of African peoples into colonial settlements, subjugation of indigenous peoples, 
and deportations of dangerous peoples by forcing them into becoming settler colonists. If 
governing metropoles meant subjugating dangerous populations by cruelty it meant 
governing colonies by mass occupation, displacement, and dispossession. As Foucault 
expressed it, sovereign power is that which ‘makes die and lets live’ (Gros 2016). We will see 
what its reversal meant shortly.  
With the effective closing of national borders and mobility restrictions during the 
coronavirus pandemic we did not witness the ‘return’ of sovereign power. It has always 
been there, but its exercise does not require the same technologies of power such as those 
noted above. Lockdown, curfew, confinement, regulation of movements, border controls 
and overall restrictions on the mobility of subject peoples are amongst the routinised and 
institutionalised technologies that sovereign power developed over a long period. What we 
have witnessed is the more widespread deployment of sovereign power during the 
coronavirus pandemic. Austria, New Zealand, or Taiwan may have been identified for acting 
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most swiftly in closing borders and China for shutting down not only external borders but 
also internal borders by enclosing entire cities. But, let us not forget that both external and 
internal borders were subjected to immediate controls on all continents though with varying 
intensities across different states. These are examples of how the exercise of sovereign 
power has become routinised and tacit and in turn less visible over time and yet ready to be 
reactivated to extract obedience from subject peoples. While accepted and even supported 
by dominant groups, and at the same time contested and brutally and cruelly experienced 
by others such as refugees, borders have become taken-for-granted forms of sovereign 
power. If the cruelties of borders have not been widely recognised that’s perhaps because 
sovereign power has rendered itself less visible not only in the sense of being perceivable 
but also because its technologies have become routinised in thought and bodies. We thus 
ought not to conflate invisibility with inexistence. Nor should we be surprised by the 
widespread obedience that sovereign power has extracted despite occasional and scattered 
protests primarily in the United States but also in other countries such as Germany and the 
UK questioning restrictions on movement mobility. What we have seen during the pandemic 
is that sovereign power is tangled with other forms of power from which it draws strength, 
but from which it needs to be analytically separated. Unlike the 17th or 18th century 
variants, sovereign power in the 21st century could not have functioned without relying on 
disciplinary and regulatory forms of power, which undoubtedly contribute to its invisibility.  
What is disciplinary power? From the 18th to 19th centuries we witness the emergence of a 
new form of power that operates on the body: its discipline, its capacities, its will. The key 
object is the human body. It is true that sovereign power also operated on the human body: 
cruelties from branding black bodies to spectacles of torture and transportations (i.e., 
forced displacements) regardless of their fatal consequences were widespread technologies 
(Browne 2015). For the accumulation of subject peoples required exercising sovereign 
power as the right to decide over the life and death of bodies (Foucault 1978, 135).  
Yet, as Foucault (1978, 139) argues, ‘… starting in the seventeenth century, this power over 
life evolved in two basic forms; these forms were not antithetical, however; they 
constituted rather two poles of development linked together by a whole intermediary 
cluster of relations.’ For Foucault disciplinary power was formed first and it was ‘…centred 
on the body as a machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion 
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of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into 
systems of efficient and economic controls’ (139). This was ‘an anatomo-politics of the 
human body’ where optimising the capacities of bodies for production increasingly became 
a primary concern. It may have started in barracks (soldiers) and on ships (slaves), but 
disciplinary power gradually produced prominent assemblages where technologies of power 
and forms of knowledge combined to create optimised bodies for production. Over the next 
three centuries disciplinary power produced clinics, prisons, hospitals, schools, workhouses, 
camps, and eventually gyms, shops, studios, and other assemblages where forms of 
knowledge were brought to bear on humans governing themselves.   
Just consider how we have collectively become experts in the anatomo-politics of our own 
bodies during the coronavirus pandemic. We have not only followed daily what medicine 
has discovered about the virus and its modes of infection, but also have internalised 
injunctions and admonishments on how to conduct ourselves safely for others. We have 
been advised to sacrifice everyday activities by isolating in order to save ourselves, others, 
and public health systems. We have developed, in an astonishingly short period of time, 
new forms of conduct by protecting ourselves and others in physical distancing, covering 
our faces, and regulating our contacts. We have developed astoundingly ritualized hygiene 
practices of disinfecting ourselves. We have exercised all these forms of submission that 
disciplinary power calls for as subject peoples concerned with our own and each other’s 
health and safety. If we followed the rules of confinement imposed by sovereign power 
obediently, we followed the rules of safety called for by disciplinary power submissively. 
What the pandemic has rendered visible is that we experience these two forms of power 
simultaneously. We, our bodies, recognized how these two forms of power – sovereign and 
disciplinary – depend on each other and work together. Under normal circumstances 
neither form of power is visible. Under the current circumstances they become revealed. 
Without a hint of irony, for those who needed help, practical guidance was offered on how 
to relearn socialising after the confinement (BBC 2020a).  
We think that Foucault’s focus on Jeremy Bentham’s panoptical prison design precisely 
captures this relationship between sovereign power and disciplinary power, which was 
governed by punishment: fines, charges, attestations, permissions, and identity cards were 
mobilised to separate those who were successfully responding to sovereign power by 
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exercising discipline from those who were not. Foucault notices, however, that disciplinary 
power slowly comes into relation with another form of power that informs it. It is this third 
form of power that troubled Foucault in the late-1970s and the subsequent studies on 
power since. Foucault originally designated it as ‘biopower’ and its associated exercise as 
‘biopolitics’. To ease some of this trouble we prefer to call it a regulatory form of power for 
reasons we briefly explain below.  
What is regulatory power? From the 19th to 20th centuries we witness the emergence of a 
power that is at once totalising and individualising. It is regulatory power ‘focused on the 
species body [population], the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the 
basis of the biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life 
expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary. Their 
supervision was affected through an entire series of interventions and regulatory controls: a 
biopolitics of the population’ (Foucault 1978, 139). Using ‘population’ as a synonym for 
‘species’ Foucault observes that the emergence of ‘… this great bipolar technology – 
anatomic and biological, individualizing and specifying, directed toward the performances of 
the body, with attention to the processes of life – characterized a power whose highest 
function was perhaps no longer to kill, but to invest life through and through’ (139). This 
enabled Foucault to see a key relation between disciplinary and regulatory forms of power. 
Each depends on the other but now disciplinary power functions most effectively as a 
positive rather than negative force. While Foucault never used this term, we think it is quite 
appropriate to define this interdependent relationship as calibration. What regulatory 
power performs is a strategy of calibration: it mobilises the formulation and/or prescription 
of appropriate forms of conduct for bodies that are necessary for, or conducive to, the 
functioning of a population’s health and wealth. More importantly, regulatory power 
calibrates the conduct of bodies with that of a population not by admonishing or punishing 
bodies for non-compliance (though that relationship between sovereign power and 
disciplinary power continues to function) but by persuading, guiding, nudging and cajoling 
bodies that their health and wealth derives from it. Bodies discipline themselves as 
responsible subjects for their own and for common good.  
We cannot think of a better illustration than a singular metric that has become a symbol of 
the current pandemic: the reproduction or R number. As explained by government and 
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media channels, R is the rate by which each body infects other bodies or the virus 
reproduces itself (Cookson 2020). If a given body infects three bodies, the reproduction is 
three times higher than if a body infects only one other body. The logic of calibration here is 
that if the body in question is identified, sequestered, and isolated, its harm to the 
population is neutralised. One UK government advertisement showed the R-rate with a 
speedometer-like graphic indicating the-then current rate of infection and admonishing 
people to ‘stay alert to keep R down’. Once epidemiology performs its function to calibrate 
bodies to populations, medicine can perform its function to cure the individual body and 
invest in its life. Much was made initially about the concept of herd immunity that would be 
gained by large numbers of people contracting and then recovering from the coronavirus. 
What is herd immunity if not essentially the exercise of the sovereign right to decide life and 
death of peoples especially when it eventually became clear that the elderly, the infirm, the 
poor, indigent, black and brown bodies most disproportionally lost their lives? If sovereign 
power ‘makes die and lets live,’ as we saw above, regulatory power ‘makes live and lets die’ 
(Gros 2016). 
To return to the relation between the accumulation of subject peoples and accumulation of 
capital (or between population health and wealth), we have witnessed a tension during the 
coronavirus pandemic in terms expressed as the trade-off between health and the 
economy. When does sovereign power (re)start the economy? What is the trade-off 
between lives and livelihoods (The Economist 2020)? If indeed the accumulation of subject 
peoples engenders accumulation of capital and accumulation of knowledge, an analysis of 
forms of power must keep all these three processes in view as they are intertwined. 
Moreover, just as there are different forms of knowledge and subject peoples, capital must 
also be understood in its different forms (economic, cultural, symbolic) as Pierre Bourdieu 
(1983) insisted.  
This brief overview has overlooked how the overlaps and dynamics between different forms 
of power function and how each depends on certain aspects of the other in the coronavirus 
pandemic. Our aim here is to both provide an historically informed overview of forms of 
power and their simultaneous existence and how the development and articulation of a 
new form of power has increased their complexity. Many objections will be made about our 
overview of the three forms of power sketched here. We recognize that questions of power 
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and especially biopower have given rise to disagreements on its functions, effects, and 
transformations (Cisney and Morar 2015). Especially the concepts of biopolitics and 
biopower have been brilliantly expanded by Ian Hacking (1982, 1990), Giorgio Agamben 
(1998), Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri (2000), Roberto Esposito (2008), Nikolas Rose (2006), 
Thomas Lemke (2011) and Achille Mbembe (2019). As Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose 
(2016) have recently shown, however, each scholar has taken ‘biopolitics’ in a particular 
direction and with mixed results. Rabinow and Rose insist that if biopower and biopolitics 
must retain their analytical power we must include at least three elements: forms of 
knowledge about life; strategies that intervene in the name of life; and, modes of 
subjectification through which people invest in their own lives. Taking simultaneously 
totalisation and individualisation as their key analytical tool they illustrate how biopower 
functions by regulating between bodies and populations. This is broadly how we see 
regulatory power but the terms biopower and biopolitics, beginning with Foucault’s sketchy 
studies, have conflated the relations between sovereign power and disciplinary power and 
between disciplinary power and regulatory power. As Paul Patton’s (2016) analysis shows it 
is very difficult to imagine how biopolitics intervenes at the level of populations rather than 
through individual bodies without some mechanisms between the two. Frederic Gros (2016) 
astutely warns against using Foucault’s lectures on biopolitics as conclusive analyses by 
illustrating that Foucault had shifted his attention to studying broadly rationalities of 
government. 
Yet, just when these studies were published and developments since the 1980s were being 
interpreted through the analytics of biopower and biopolitics, a fourth form of power may 
have already been emerging. To put it differently, while studies on modern power have 
been attempting to plot various new events such as the development of apps, devices, and 
platforms into a genealogical series already named and recognised such as ‘algorithmic 
governmentality’, ‘computational capitalism’, or ‘age of algorithms’ (see Amoore 2020; 
Rouvroy 2013; Rouvroy and Berns 2013; Stiegler 2019, ch. 1, s. 4), a new event may have 
been unfolding in the present but, like we stated earlier, an event that perhaps remained 
dimly visible and barely articulable – until the coronavirus pandemic. It appears to us that 
the task of the present is to attempt to study the fourth form of power historically which in 
turn will enable us to recursively reinterpret the three forms of power.  
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The birth of sensory power?  
The key development in the exercise of sensory power has been the objects that are 
enacted between bodies and populations. To us, the birth of sensory power signals that 
power is not as bipolar as Foucault thought: individualising and specifying, anatomic and 
biological or molar and molecular. Monitoring the performances of bodies with attention to 
the processes of life necessitated segmenting populations into what Hacking (2002, 2007) 
called ‘kinds’ of peoples. Foucault had anticipated that disciplinary and regulatory forms of 
power were ‘linked together by a whole intermediary cluster of relations’ but he did not 
specify these intermediary clusters of relations (Foucault 1978, 139). What then are these 
kinds of relations between bodies and populations? What are the kinds that power 
assembles? How are populations themselves divided into kinds that function in overlapping 
and intersectional ways? In terms of relations between regulatory power and disciplinary 
power the kinds were produced as class, gender, and race. But new intermediary clusters 
may have emerged that were not articulable and visible forty years ago when Foucault, 
Deleuze and those who followed their work were writing but developments since then and 
especially in the early months of 2020 suggest that we can identify a new form of power 
that assembles ‘intermediary clusters of relations.’  While Foucault did not define clusters, 
we suggest that clusters are intermediary objects of government between bodies and 
populations that a new form of power enacts and governs through sensory assemblages. 
To put it differently, we want to suggest that sensory assemblages of which integrated apps, 
devices, and platforms are a part, enact specific objects of government: clusters. Although 
the term ‘clusters’ may be thought to have relevance only for the coronavirus pandemic and 
the epidemiological models and vocabularies that dominate public debates, it is also 
important to remember that Foucault originally developed his concepts of disciplinary and 
regulatory forms of power with keen attention to responses to epidemics as a recent 
compilation has shown (Foucault et al. 2020).  In any case, when we refer to clusters, we do 
so in this broader sense. 
Before we discuss clusters as objects of government, however, we will discuss sensory 
assemblages because they bring clusters into being. Our formulation of sensory 
assemblages may appear resonant with Deleuze’s (1988, 32-41; Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 
1837 & 1227) use of Foucault and subsequent developments especially in science and 
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technology studies (Barry 2006). Paul Patton (2018) already made analytical use of equally 
sketchy analyses of Deleuze’s (1990a, 1990b) societies of control. Leaving aside assumptions 
that we have already questioned – that societies of discipline were giving way to or were 
replaced by societies of control or that biopolitics intervenes without intermediary 
mechanisms – Patton nonetheless makes pertinent observations on how control societies 
were oriented to technologies of modulating bodies rather than punishing or disciplining 
them, and in doing so were creating new assemblages. We argue that new studies on data 
politics inspired by primarily Foucault and Deleuze began pointing in a rather different 
direction (Amoore 2015; Beckman 2018; Fuller 2017; Fuller and Goffey 2012; Galloway 
2006; Galloway and Thacker 2007; Mackenzie 2015, 2017). To put it differently, new studies 
on data politics signify, at least to us, that ‘control societies’ are more like a continuation of 
‘disciplinary societies’ governed through new technological means such as biometric 
recognition, automated surveillance, algorithmic government and digital spying. We think 
that sensory power is a related but a distinct form of power different from what control has 
come to mean in the phrase ‘control societies.’  
Obviously, we are not interested in proposing the dawn or age of ‘sensory societies.’ The 
difficult task ahead is to take into account these studies on data politics by resignifying them 
through the analytics of power sketched here, and to then interpret how a fourth form of 
power is nestled in but became visible amongst the other three forms of power during the 
coronavirus pandemic. This is no mean feat. We cannot attempt it here with the rigorous 
analysis it demands. Nonetheless, we offer observations and propositions about how new 
assemblages of sensory power have been developing and how the pandemic makes them 
visible.  
All forms of power work through assemblages that enact their objects through myriad 
technologies and relations:  sovereign power governs territories through assemblages that 
enact colonies, dominions, states (cartography, maps, surveyors, borders); disciplinary 
power governs bodies through assemblages that make up prisons, camps, hospitals, 
factories, prisons, schools, workhouses (architecture, walls, fences, guards, gates); and 
regulatory power governs populations through assemblages that enact attributes, 
categories and classifications such as class, gender and race (administrative records, 
enumerations). In the same way, as illustrated in Table 1, sensory power governs clusters 
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through new assemblages that make up apps, platforms, and devices (software, 
transmitters, code, protocols).  
While sensory power works through sensory assemblages to enact its objects of 
government, we do not think that this means a new form of power is replacing existing 
forms but rather is articulating with/in them. Thus, a new form of power is to be found 
nestled in existing forms but nonetheless mobilizing new strategies and technologies. But to 
articulate what is sensory power we need to first discuss how sensory assemblages produce 
clusters. In a recent chapter we posed five propositions concerning clusters on the basis of 
our analysis of imperial censuses and contemporary deployments of big data and analytics 
to govern the postcolony (Isin and Ruppert 2019). We will still refer to these five but here 
we exemplify and further develop them in relation to the exercise of power during the 
coronavirus pandemic. All propositions below apply somewhat to assemblages of sovereign, 
disciplinary, and regulatory forms of power but are central to the strategies of sensory 
power and how it functions, which becomes clearer, we hope, as each is developed.  
Clusters are relational objects. During the coronavirus pandemic, novel objects of 
government have become visible and articulable. We have seen reference to various entities 
such as hotspots, epicentres, and bubbles (BBC 2020b; Chan et al. 2020; FT 2020; Mason 
2020). These were of course related to the spread of the coronavirus, but they were meant 
to indicate how bodies either infected or healthy were related to each other. What made 
them bubbles, hotspots or epicentres is that these bodies came into contact with a 
condition (infectious, healthy) that made them an object of interest for government. This 
interest is not about capturing, punishing, or disciplining these bodies but about identifying 
and providing the means by which bodies can modulate their behaviour or conduct with 
desirable outcomes. Modulation is different from the technologies of adjustment of 
regulatory power, which works through knowledges such as statistics. By contrast, 
governing clusters involves ongoing and ‘live’ tracking of their performance through which 
decisions and interventions can be formulated with immediacy by narrowing the time 
between identification and action.  This difference can be exemplified by considering how 
gatherings of bodies for celebrations, raves, and beach parties elicited new policing 
concerns about discipline and punishment during the easing of the lockdown in the UK and 
France in  the summer of 2020 (Bland et al. 2020). By contrast, clusters as objects of sensory 
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power do not simply exist as physical gatherings of bodies but are relations that sensory 
assemblages as relations between ‘infectious’ or ‘healthy’ bodies. The sensory assemblages 
that produce clusters involve relations between human and non-human actors including 
devices, sensors, platforms, practices, data, and methods, and agencies, authorities, 
technicians, and professionals in governments, corporations, and non-governmental 
organisations. While the devices that make up sensory assemblages may not be entirely 
digital (yet) – as contact tracing programmes involving public health personnel and analogue 
practices well illustrate – tracking, testing, and tracing bodies require frequent gathering, 
storage, and transmission of data by various agents and authorities. Along with lockdown, 
distancing, and isolation, tracking subjects who have been infected, tracing subjects who 
may have had physical contact with them, and alerting both clusters to isolate themselves 
requires exercising technologies of power appropriate to these objectives.  
In relation to tracing and tracking apps we have seen how they involve competitive struggles 
between and amongst states, international organizations, and multinational corporations. 
This is a very different scenario than when states had virtual monopoly of knowledge about 
their subjects. Now technology companies command such knowledge and intensely 
compete with each other for hegemony. But the competition is also between various 
competing professions involving epidemiologists, statisticians, data scientists, programmers, 
app developers, security experts, methodologists and so on who are transnational and 
whose expertise traverse national borders. While sensory assemblages may not be entirely 
digital (yet), they nonetheless involve various combinations of digital technologies such as 
satellites, data centres, transmitters, receivers, and mobile devices and include analytics 
such as algorithms, machine learning, and cloud computing. Consider, for example, the 
mobility reports produced by Apple, Google, and Facebook. Through global relations 
between human and non-human actors such as devices, technicians and programmers, they 
accumulated data about infections and deaths which in turn came to inform their 
development of a tracking and tracing app toolkit (Apple 2020; Facebook 2020; Google 
2020). Here we can see how the tracking and tracing performed by these major technology 
corporations are by no means limited to disease but related to other forms of conduct such 
as watching, listening, reading, communicating, and so on, and through which people form 
relations which can be enacted as clusters. While enacting and controlling clusters to 
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maintain the accumulation of subject peoples (health) and accumulation of capital (wealth) 
has proved an elusive objective, the development of coronavirus apps has made visible a 
form of power whose object is clusters. That is, clusters are not novel to coronavirus as 
objects of power but related to sensory assemblages already in operation in several fields of 
commerce and government.  
Clusters are multiple objects. If sensory assemblages propagate, multiply, and reproduce 
clusters how do people become related? Clusters do not merely constitute ‘new’ 
representations of ‘old’ populations. Clusters do not map on to populations of regulatory 
power mostly compiled for and by national authorities. Within six months the coronavirus 
traversed borders and reproduced itself across nearly two hundred states despite 
authorities’ closing borders with variable intensities. What is lost in cross-national 
comparisons is how these states were only marginally able to control the transversal 
reproduction of the coronavirus. At the same time, so did sensory assemblages spread, 
multiply, adapt and mutate clusters. To understand this requires seeing how sensory 
assemblages produce the objects they represent. It is for this reason data can be 
understood as an agent within sensory assemblages for what they might perform changes 
depending on dispersed and transversal relations. When data about clusters is brought into 
being by sensory assemblages of experts, methods, technologies, organisations, practices, 
authorities, subjects and so on it is never under the strict control or influence of any of 
them. It is through its circulation and repurposing that sensory assemblages get detached 
from the authorities that make them up and come to enact and act on objects as well as 
subjects in myriad ways. It is not only clusters of the infected and those who are contacted 
by the infected that traverse borders but also different combinations of strategies and 
technologies, knowledges, and all of the actants and actors that constitute multiple clusters 
(networks, associations, relations) that invariably traverse nation-state borders.   
Clusters are fluid objects. Conventional population statistics typically involve 
sociodemographic categories and then the collection of data through usually self-elicited 
accounts that use various methods to fit people into categories (Ruppert 2011). As Hacking 
(2002, 2007) observed, the making of these categories produced ‘rigid new 
conceptualisations of the human being.’ By contrast, sensory assemblages enact clusters 
based on the performance of bodies rather than imposing categories and classifications in 
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advance. Unlike categories, clusters are generated as a consequence of analytics such as 
machine learning and algorithms that do not identify associations between existing 
variables, but explore multi-dimensional patterns amongst ‘hundreds and in some cases 
tens of thousands of variables and sample sizes of millions or billions of data’ (Mackenzie 
2015, 434). Differences are not understood as ‘variables’ as in statistics, but derive from 
combinations of attributes from different ‘forms of data (text, images, video, transactions, 
sensors), not just the variables measured using classical statistical tabulations of surveys, 
polls or random sampling’ (Mackenzie 2015, 433). While variables can also be diverse, a key 
difference from the conventional statistical production of populations is the registering of 
multiple forms of conduct or what people do such as their movements and actions 
(transactions, choices, statements, interactions) where the focus of inquiry is not on the 
individual factors that affect conduct, but on aggregate patterns and connections: 
contagion, dissemination, influence, association, etc. (Ruppert et al. 2013). It is through the 
continuous tracing, tracking, monitoring, and modulating work of sensory assemblages that 
produce clusters that are fluid (and dynamic) rather than solid (and static) objects of 
government. If clusters are rendered sensible as fluid and dynamic how are they rendered 
visible?  
Clusters are visualised objects. Like sovereign, disciplinary, and regulatory forms of power, 
sensory power works through visualisations. Each form of power has produced its regime of 
visualisation from cartography to anatomical diagrams and statistical charts, but the 
visualisation of sensory assemblages has precipitated entirely novel imaginaries and 
techniques of representation. If Edward Tufte (1983) famously insisted that visualisation can 
be a technique ‘for reasoning about statistical information’ (9) that ‘reveals data’ and can be 
more ‘precise than conventional statistical computations’ (13), it was Stephen Few (2006), 
also famously, who operationalised its logic: dashboards. The millions of data points that 
make up sensory assemblages have mobilised visualisations as not simply representations 
but a key technique through which data scientists make data visible, sensible and articulable 
(Mackenzie 2015, 437). These visualisations identify unseen patterns and include interactive 
elements and dashboards that enable seeing the effects of combining different data on 
features of a population (Bamberger 2016). We suggest that the ‘dashboard’ has become a 
primary technology of government like cartography, anatomy, and charts. Their ubiquity for 
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governing cities has been studied (Kitchin et al. 2015; Kitchin and McArdle 2018; Mattern 
2015). However, for all the seemingly accurate cartographic representations that dominate 
publicly available visualisations about the coronavirus pandemic such as those showcased 
on the Johns Hopkins University dashboard, all that they have offered, especially in early 
2020, are fairly basic data and statistics mapped onto national borders (Johns Hopkins 
University 2020). Similarly, several other dashboards are also rather basic (NHS Providers 
2020; Thorlund et al. 2020; UK 2020; WHO 2020).  Yet, the sample skilfully compiled by Neel 
Patel (2020) shows that there is much more being developed in relation to the coronavirus. 
There are, however, much more sophisticated ‘dashboards’ such as those for financial 
systems (markets, transactions), transportation systems (air, rail, sea), military operations, 
and managing football games (Mattern 2017). There are also rapidly developing dashboards 
in fields such as migration or policing where dashboards have been deployed for governing 
movement and criminality (Aradau and Blanke 2017; Tazzioli 2018). As Kitchin (2018, 113) 
argues, initially, most city dashboards used traditional data generated in specific periods; 
over the last few years, however, they came to incorporate data produced in real-time by 
sensors and devices including data scraped from social media and through crowdsourcing. 
So, while dashboards on the pandemic remain relatively basic, they are part of a larger 
series and given the intensive investments by governments, research funders and 
universities that are underway, they are likely to develop into more sophisticated forms. 
This brings us to the most important aspect of clusters: they are not only real-time but live. 
What is the difference?  
Clusters are live objects. While real-time data may be presented in dashboards and subjects 
acted upon through disciplinary or regulatory forms of power, sensory power organises 
machine learning algorithms so that measurement, identification, action, and intervention 
can happen live and recursively. By live we mean forms of data are mobilised because of 
their immediacy and which can take on varying intensities and temporalities. However, the 
multiplicity and fluidity of clusters that makes them live also renders them difficult to 
control by a singular authority. It is this last aspect of sensory assemblages that brings us 
closest to what we mean by sensory power. It involves modulating the performance of 
bodies and populations through governing interventions that rely on technologies of 
machine learning, algorithms, and visualisations of clusters as relations. Rather than the 
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periodic ‘stocktaking’ of conventional statistics, populations are divided into clusters that 
are live and have pulses, flows, and patterns. Rather than the accuracy and precision of data 
on numbers infected, contacted, recovered, and deceased, it is knowledge of the spread, 
peaks and troughs of the disease that mobilises governing interventions. In turn, data serves 
a dual function: for identifying attributes or features that make up clusters (e.g., infected, 
contacted) but then monitoring and evaluating those features live (e.g., daily changes in R 
metric hotspots, epicentres, bubbles) thereby provoking changes in conduct (how people 
govern their movements in relation to hotspots) and sovereign and disciplinary 
interventions (easing or increasing lockdown). Identifying attributes produces data in much 
the same way as classical data regimes: populations are periodically measured with indices, 
rates, metrics, and indicators. However, modulation between bodies and populations 
through clusters enacted by sensory assemblages work continuously with pulses and signals. 
It is a recursive logic captured in four stages of data analytics: descriptive and exploratory 
analysis (what is happening, often in real-time); doing predictive analytics (‘what is likely to 
happen’); detection (‘tracking who is likely to succeed and who will fail’); and evaluation and 
data diagnostics (‘how to improve programme performance’) (Bamberger 2016, 60-61). 
What these elements encompass is how the data of sensory power is not separate from but 
interwoven with sovereign, disciplinary and regulatory strategies. We suggest that during 
the coronavirus pandemic this aspect of sensory power has become especially visible and 
articulable.  
We mentioned earlier the emergence of sensory assemblages that bring into being clusters 
such as hotspots and epicentres (Kitchin 2020). These have become objects of government 
especially in the race to develop apps to track and trace the reproduction of the virus and 
develop interventions such as immunity passports in order to return people to productive 
labour (Ada Lovelace Institute 2020). The competitive struggles between national 
authorities such as in Britain, Germany, and France and multinational corporations such as 
Apple and Google have been reported as struggles over privacy, but these struggles 
certainly also involve control over data, its storage, and access (Bowcott 2020; Levy 2020; 
McGee et al. 2020; Miller and Abboud 2020; Sabbagh 2020). Nevertheless, the development 
of such apps illustrates the birth of sensory power at its most incipient state: live governing 
of the dynamic relation between bodies and populations through the enactment of clusters.  
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It is worth briefly dwelling on their logic. The app aims at tracking the locations of bodies 
infected with the virus, notifying, testing, and isolating (If necessary) them in order to stop 
its reproduction, tracing all bodies that infected bodies came into contact with, notifying, 
testing and isolating (if necessary) them as well, and thus slowing the reproduction (R-value) 
of the virus (Warrell and Bradshaw 2020). Essentially this creates a live cluster of bodies 
infected or potentially infected by the coronavirus. Governing bodies in clusters, however, 
requires interventions at the stages of notifying, testing, and isolating in order to be 
effective. Clearly, this is a relation between regulatory power and disciplinary power: to 
achieve the desired infection rate R, disciplinary technologies of power such as the consent 
of individuals to agree to be notified and act according to the results whether that involves 
getting tested or (if necessary) self-isolating. This is a costly and inefficient exercise of 
power. Yet, the enthusiasm about a potential app and its promise to deliver a game-changer 
is palpable: to minimise disciplinary power and instead maximise sensory power. In other 
words, to formulate the problem of government as a relation between regulatory power 
and sensory power.  
Leaving aside the fact that such an app may never function as intended despite numerous 
attempts – a point to which we will return below – it is worth dwelling further on a 
potentially successful app (Solomon and Miller 2020; Warrell et al. 2020). We have noted 
various stages of the cycle: tracking, notifying, testing, isolating, tracing, notifying, testing, 
and slowing. If solutions were found to automate the testing and isolating stages, essentially 
multiple, relational, fluid, visualised, and live clusters could be governing themselves. There 
are of course technological limits to such a scenario. There are also severe legal, political, 
and cultural limits but such limits may become surmountable if not during the coronavirus 
pandemic but soon in another field of application where such limits seem less relevant such 
as in finance or transport logistics.  
We thus find it difficult to believe that we could imagine such scenarios without 
technologies for tracking and tracing peoples being already present in other fields than 
epidemiology. We mentioned earlier that the accumulation of capital in finance, 
manufacturing, retail, transportation, hospitality, entertainment and other industries has 
been accompanied by the accumulation of subject peoples through tracking and tracing 
their movements and the modulation of sentiments, needs and desires. We have also 
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mentioned finance, policing, crime, migration, borders, and education as such fields of 
government where sensory power is making its appearance. The live data produced from 
sensory assemblages pervade these sectors and fields. What we are observing through the 
coronavirus pandemic is the acceleration of strategies and technologies of sensory power 
that have emerged over the last forty years in these fields. 
The resistances that power elicits 
Alas, power is a treacherous concept to think with at least since Max Weber (1978, 926-940) 
attempted to domesticate Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1994, 35-67; 2001, 106-153) concept. We 
think Michel Foucault (1977b) liberated Nietzsche from Weber by historically investigating 
forms of power (especially since the 17th century in Europe) rather than asking what power 
is. That liberation gave rise to questions not only about how does power function but how 
then is resistance possible? We pose this question after having first offered five propositions 
that, taken together, illustrate how sensory power works through assemblages that track, 
trace, and visualise the performance of clusters by enacting them as multiple, relational, 
fluid, visualised and live objects.  We have argued that this signals the birth of sensory 
power. Here we turn to some thoughts about the limits that this and all other forms of 
power encounter and the resistances that each elicits. Such limits, as Howard Caygill (2013) 
says, elicit both misfires and resistances. First, much of what we said about each form of 
power and its strategies almost never function as desired, imagined, or dreamed. There are 
always limits to how each form of power plays out. Each almost always betrays its governing 
intentions. For sensory power, code errs, algorithms misfire, data lacks, apps fail. Yet, the 
exercise of power, even when encountering its limits, produces effects on the accumulation 
of subject peoples and accumulation of capital. The exercise of power precipitates, 
organizes, and mobilises practices that exceed intentions and produce paradoxical effects. 
Second, forms of power always elicit resistance. The analytics of power we have developed 
here and illustrated in Table 1 assumes that each form of power elicits a type of resistance: 
sovereign power elicits revolt (protest, uprising, occupation), disciplinary power elicits 
subversion (illegible, polysemic, allegorical) and regulatory power elicits evasion (escape, 
mimesis, deception, parasitism). To put it emphatically, it is these resistances that make all 
forms of power visible and articulable. Each form of power draws forth what is a latent or 
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potential resistance into a sensible, visible, and articulable existence. Thus, such limits are 
not sources of lament, but are signals of resistance and objects of analysis. 
We suggest that a characteristic type of resistance that has come to symbolise sensory 
power involves an interplay between transparency and opacity. As Birchall (2016) notes, the 
rise of transparency as a political ideal misreads its symbiotic relationship with opacity such 
that at issue is not a choice between the two but how to identify their tensions and 
contradictions. Fuller (2017), for example, suggests that transparency and opacity constitute 
not so much a zero-sum game but a game of power. Observing how transparency has 
become the quintessential virtue of contemporary life, Fuller notes that in relation to 
authorities it implies the possibility of accountability based on the assumption that 
everything can be rendered into accounts that are clear and coherent and that can be 
scrutinized. At the same time, transparency also leads to the creation of ‘black sites’ – a 
cynically racist term describing sites where military strategists created sealed sites where 
some of the cruellest technologies of sovereign power (waterboarding, electrocutions, 
beatings, and sleep deprivation) were exercised. As Fuller says, to maintain transparency as 
a virtue, such places must be made opaque. To this we might add that, in the case of 
coronavirus, the accumulation of capital also depends on opacity to gain competitive 
advantage. The data that sensory power produces is transparent (‘open data’) but how such 
data is transformed into analytics or intelligence remains opaque (Noble 2018; Pasquale 
2015) as are the infrastructures, code, algorithms and machine learning practices (Veale 
2020) that are part of the relations that make up sensory assemblages 
How then do transparency and opacity play out in modes of subjectification?  If indeed 
sensory power demands and dictates absolute transparency, then revolt, subversion and 
evasion become inappropriate tactics. The accumulation of subjects depends on bodies 
becoming transparent in their movements, desires, and needs. As such, it becomes more 
difficult for subjects to perform ‘I would prefer not to’ (Žižek 2006) or ‘consent not to be a 
single being’ (Moten 2017) when sensory power makes these decisions without consent and 
distributes bodies dynamically across multiple clusters in which bodies perform responsive 
actions. We have developed various consent games where we perform the illusion of having 
control, but sensory power relentlessly and voraciously tracks and traces our movements, 
desires, and needs. What then are the forms of resistance that sensory power elicits? If 
 24 
 
indeed bodies are enacted by sensory assemblages as part of multiple, relational,  fluid, 
visualised and live clusters, a problem of power becomes not only how to act through revolt, 
subversion, and evasion but to resist the learning machine through opacity. This involves the 
concealing (encryption, anonymisation, aliases) of traces (spoofing, cloaking), movements 
(virtual private networks, tor networks), and sentiments (allegory, irony, ruses, memes) and 
thus making the workings and effects of power transparent. If we had any innocence about 
the ways we are incorporated into sensory assemblages through apps, devices, and 
platforms before the coronavirus pandemic, then our hope is that we have lost that 
innocence as sensory power has become all too visible and articulable in the resistances 
that it elicits. 
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